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Safety management in repair, maintenance, minor alteration and 1 
addition works: A knowledge management perspective 2 
 3 
Carol. K. H. Hon1 and Albert, P.C. Chan2 4 
 5 
Abstract: Safety of repair, maintenance, alteration and addition (RMAA) works has long been 6 
neglected because RMAA works are often minute and only last for a short period of time. With 7 
rising importance of the RMAA sector in many developed societies, safety of RMAA works has 8 
begun to draw attention. Many RMAA contracting companies are SMEs which do not have 9 
comprehensive safety management systems. Existing safety legislation and regulations for new 10 
construction sites are not fully applicable to RMAA works. Instead of relying on explicit and 11 
well established safety systems, tacit safety knowledge plays an extremely important role in 12 
RMAA projects. To improve safety of RMAA works, safety knowledge should be better 13 
managed. However, safety knowledge is difficult to capture in RMAA works. This study aims to 14 
examine safety management practices of RMAA contracting companies to see how safety 15 
knowledge of RMAA projects is managed. Findings show that RMAA contracting companies 16 
undertaking large scale RMAA projects have more initiatives of safety management. Safety 17 
management of small scale RMAA works relies heavily on the motivation of site supervisors and 18 
self-regulation of workers. Better tacit knowledge management improves safety performance. To 19 
enhance safety capability of RMAA contracting companies, a knowledge sharing culture should 20 
be cultivated. The government should provide assistance to SMEs to implement proper safety 21 
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management practices in small-sized projects. Potentials of applying computer software 22 
technology in RMAA projects to capture, store, and retrieve safety information should be 23 
explored. Employees should be motivated to share safety knowledge by giving proper 24 
recognition to those who are willing to share.   25 
 26 
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 30 
Introduction 31 
 32 
Construction safety performance of many developed countries have been improving and 33 
gradually reached a plateau. The prevailing challenge of the industry is to find out ways for 34 
further safety improvement. Knowledge management is often regarded as a way to improve 35 
productivity and competitiveness (Javernick-Will 2012). By the same token, proper safety 36 
knowledge management may be one of the ways to improve construction companies’ safety 37 
performance. Hallowell (2012) asserted that better safety knowledge management can improve 38 
the organization’s capacity of adapting to changes, resulting in better safety performance. 39 
Hallowell (2012) found that high performing companies have distinguished abilities in managing 40 
implicit knowledge with formal processes. Safety knowledge of the construction industry is 41 
resourceful but has yet to be capitalized. Knowledge management studies relating to construction 42 
safety have been limited (Hallowell 2012). Many of them focus on lessons learned from large 43 
companies (e.g. Robinson et al. 2005; Carrillo and Chinowsky 2006) and their findings may not 44 
be directly applicable to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Besides, many SMEs do 45 
not have formal knowledge management system. Safety knowledge management of SMEs in the 46 
construction industry is a rather uncharted-area.  47 
 48 
Repair and maintenance, minor alteration and addition (RMAA) works are usually undertaken by 49 
SMEs. SMEs are defined by the Hong Kong Government as “any manufacturing business which 50 
employs fewer than 100 persons in Hong Kong, or any non-manufacturing business which 51 
employs fewer than 50 persons in Hong Kong” (Hong Kong Government, 2012a). Adopting the 52 
same classification system, RMAA contracting companies in Hong Kong employing fewer than 53 
50 persons are classified as SMEs. Authoritative figure on the number of RMAA contracting 54 
companies in Hong Kong is not available in the public domain. According to recent information 55 
of the Hong Kong Government (2012b), there were over 14,300 Registered Minor Works 56 
Contractors in Hong Kong as at 31 March 2012. Minor Works Control System, which simplifies 57 
the application procedures of minor buildings works, was fully implemented on 31 December 58 
2012. It requires RMAA works to be undertaken by Registered Minor Works Contractors. Thus, 59 
it can be inferred that more than 14,300 numbers of contractors are active in the RMAA sector.  60 
 61 
The RMAA sector has been of rising importance in developed societies because of rising 62 
awareness of sustainability and aging buildings. For example, RMAA works in Hong Kong 63 
accounted for 45% of the construction market in 2010 (Hon and Chan 2013). The RMAA sector 64 
is expected to grow even further because the Hong Kong Government has recently launched a 65 
number of policies to improve safety of ageing buildings. Mandatory Building Inspection 66 
Scheme (MBIS) and Mandatory Window Inspection Scheme (MWIS) were both implemented on 67 
30 June 2012. Under the MBIS scheme, the Buildings Department will select 2,000 private 68 
buildings aged 30 years or above (domestic buildings not exceeding three storeys are exempted) 69 
per year for building inspection and follow up with necessary repair and maintenance works. 70 
Subsequent inspections will be done every 10 years (Development Bureau, 2010). For MWIS, 71 
the Buildings Department will select about 5,800 private buildings aged 10 years or above every 72 
year for inspection and repair works (domestic buildings not exceeding three storeys are 73 
exempted). Subsequent window inspections will be done every five years (Development Bureau, 74 
2010). To dovetail theses schemes, subsidies are available for building owners to apply for repair 75 
and maintenance of their buildings. All these measures will lead to an increase in the volume of 76 
RMAA works (Hon and Chan, 2013), which, in turn, will increase the magnitude of safety 77 
incidents in the RMAA sector. 78 
 79 
Accidents occurring in RMAA works have been rising. For example, the RMAA sector 80 
accounted for 66.7% (six out of nine) fatal accidents in the construction industry of Hong Kong 81 
in 2010 (Hon and Chan 2013). Undoubtedly, safety of RMAA works deserves serious attention; 82 
however, it has long been undermined because RMAA projects are often small in scale and 83 
undertaken by SMEs (Hon et al. 2010). As Hinze and Gambatese (2006) advocated, safety 84 
research has been focused on large general construction and design firms, neglecting those small 85 
specialty contractors. Safety of specialty contractors, such as subcontractors undertaking RMAA 86 
works, should be better understood. 87 
 88 
This study originates from a larger research initiative of safety climate of repair, maintenance, 89 
minor alteration, addition (RMAA) works in Hong Kong, a sector which consists of many SMEs. 90 
Inspired by the work of Hallowell’s (2012) safety knowledge management study of construction 91 
companies in the United States, this study focuses on examining safety management of the 92 
RMAA sector in Hong Kong from a knowledge management perspective. Safety knowledge in 93 
RMAA works is particularly difficult to maintain because of small project scale, short duration 94 
and dispersed locations of RMAA works (Hon et al. 2012). Most RMAA contracting companies 95 
are small and medium-sized which lack resources for proper safety management, not to mention 96 
safety knowledge management. This paper aims to analyze current safety management of the 97 
RMAA sector from a knowledge management perspective. The objective is to examine how 98 
safety knowledge is captured and reused in safety management system of RMAA contracting 99 
companies. Recommendations for improving safety management of RMAA works are offered. 100 
This paper will be useful to better manage safety knowledge of RMAA contracting companies 101 
and improve their safety capability. 102 
 103 
Safety of the RMAA sector in Hong Kong  104 
 105 
The RMAA sector has been identified by the Hong Kong Government as one of the key areas for 106 
safety improvement (Legislative Council, 2011). The Construction Industry Council, a statutory 107 
coordinating body for the construction industry of Hong Kong, has set up a Task Force on Work 108 
Safety of Repair, Maintenance, Alterations and Additions (RMAA) Sites to especially look into 109 
the ways for improving safety of RMAA works (Construction Industry Council, 2012). The 110 
RMAA sector has its own uniqueness rendering safety management of RMAA works different 111 
from new construction works. Thus, safety of RMAA works deserves separate research 112 
endeavors.  113 
 114 
RMAA works are usually conducted in enclosed building structures which may not resemble 115 
construction sites. RMAA workers may easily underestimate the risks involved in conducting 116 
their tasks (Hon et al. 2010). Unlike new construction projects, working environment of RMAA 117 
projects varies, making it difficult to control potential risks and problems in RMAA works. For 118 
example, concrete strength of aged buildings is different from that of new buildings.  External 119 
wall repair and maintenance works of aged buildings are different from that of new buildings 120 
because of different concrete strength of external wall. Instead of adopting standard practices, 121 
different method statements have to be designed to suit ad hoc situation of RMAA projects. 122 
Safety management faces a challenge to provide adequate instructions on undertaking the 123 
RMAA work safely (Hon et al. 2012).  124 
 125 
Term contract nature of some RMAA projects makes safety supervision difficult because RMAA 126 
work tasks are widely scattered (Hon et al. 2012). Different subcontracting works of new 127 
construction projects are likely to be responsible by individual specialty subcontractors of a 128 
single trade; however, nature of RMAA works generally requires workers to have multi-skills to 129 
perform multi-tasks. Very often, RMAA tasks are not done by specialists of a single trade. 130 
RMAA workers may be endangered when performing tasks that they are not so familiar with 131 
(Hon et al. 2010).  132 
 133 
A fatal case analysis revealing the root causes of accidents in RMAA works was done by Hon 134 
and Chan (2013). Hon and Chan (2013) analyzed 119 RMAA fatal cases occurred between 135 
January 2000 and October 2011 in Hong Kong. Fall of person from height was the top killer of 136 
the RMAA sector, accounting for 72 (62%) of the 119 RMAA accidents in the aforesaid period. 137 
Three clusters of fall from height fatalities were identified, they were: 1) bamboo scaffolders 138 
aged between 25 and 34 who fell from external wall/facade in the beginning of weekdays; 2) 139 
miscellaneous workers aged between 45 and 54 who fell from other/unknown places in the end 140 
of weekdays; and 3) manual labour aged between 35 and 44 who fell at floor level/from floor 141 
openings in weekends. The main unsafe conditions leading to fatal falls were unsafe process and 142 
improper procedures whereas the main unsafe action leading to fatal falls was improper usage of 143 
safety belt. Young and inexperienced bamboo scaffolders were particularly susceptible to fatal 144 
falls.  145 
 146 
Safety knowledge management of construction projects 147 
 148 
Knowledge is an important asset of a company. Proper knowledge management helps the 149 
company to achieve efficiency and improves performance (Kululanga and McCaffer 2001). 150 
Knowledge management helps individuals to share their tacit knowledge and transforming tacit 151 
knowledge into explicit knowledge. According to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), there are four 152 
ways of turning explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge, they are socialization, externalization, 153 
combination and internalization (Fong and Chu 2006). Companies successfully capturing tacit 154 
knowledge of their employees will outperform other companies which have the same tacit 155 
knowledge but uncaptured and left idle (Chinowsky and Carrillo 2007).  156 
 157 
Knowledge management in the construction industry involves management of project knowledge 158 
and knowledge management within individual firms (Kamara et al. 2002). Knowledge 159 
management within a project changes in context and content as the project progresses from 160 
design stage to construction stage. Knowledge management within a construction firm involves 161 
the ability to transfer knowledge across different projects. Very often, knowledge management 162 
initiatives are adopted without having given the label of knowledge management.  As revealed 163 
by Kamara et al. (2002), initiatives of knowledge management of construction firms includes 164 
reassignment of people to different projects, the use of standards and practice guidelines, 165 
contractual arrangements, intranets, and specific activities such as post-project reviews. These 166 
are, however, organizational strategies but not necessarily dedicated strategies for knowledge 167 
management. It seems that knowledge management has not received enough attention in the 168 
construction industry, especially by the SMEs.   169 
 170 
Safety knowledge is important to successful safety management and good safety performance 171 
(Hallowell 2012). Safety knowledge can be explicit or tacit. For explicit knowledge, it is 172 
knowledge that has been explicitly explained, recorded, or documented. In the construction 173 
industry, it can be accident records, safety legislation, regulations and guidelines (Hadikusumo 174 
and Rowlinson 2004). Accident records provide useful information for risk assessment. 175 
Analysing accident records in terms of frequency occurrence and degree of seriousness allow 176 
better allocation of safety resources. More attention and resources should be given to safety 177 
hazards with high occurrence frequency and serious consequences. Safety legislation, regulations 178 
and guidelines provide the minimum requirements of site safety. However, meeting these 179 
stipulated standards are not enough to maintain a safe working environment. Safety legislations 180 
of Hong Kong are self-regulatory, that is, legislations only give a rough guideline leaving the 181 
flexibility for the companies to decide their own company safety practices.  182 
 183 
Construction projects are complex and dynamic. Ad hoc events often occur. It is obvious that 184 
proper safety management of construction projects rely not on the basic safety legislation, 185 
regulations and guidelines but experience of the project team, which is tacit knowledge 186 
(Hadikusumo and Rowlinson 2004). In this way, tacit knowledge plays a decisive role in 187 
determining the safety performance. For tactic knowledge, it is knowledge that is intuitive and 188 
guided by experience. In the construction industry, safety hazard recognition based on the 189 
experience of safety engineers is an important source of tacit knowledge. Safety hazard 190 
recognition is indispensable to construction safety management (Carter and Smith 2006). If 191 
management cannot identify potential hazards, relevant training and measures cannot be 192 
provided accordingly (Hadikusumo and Rowlinson 2004). Large construction companies may 193 
have a comprehensive safety management system to properly capture, store and utilize tacit 194 
knowledge; however, this is often impossible for SMEs undertaking RMAA projects to imitate. 195 
The way that tacit knowledge is handled by SMEs needs further investigation.  196 
 197 
Knowledge management processes basically include acquisition, storage, and transfer.  198 
Knowledge acquisition is “the process that involves imbibing information including making 199 
meaning of situations and other stimuli from the internal and external business environment” 200 
(Kululanga and McCaffer 2001). A construction company can acquire tacit knowledge internally 201 
through their staff, internal benchmarking studies and experience or externally through recruiting 202 
staff from innovative organizations, collaborating with others, attending conferences etc 203 
(Kululanga and McCaffer 2001). According to Hadikusumo and Rowlinson (2004), there are two 204 
ways of capturing tacit safety knowledge from safety engineers or managers. The first one could 205 
be face-to-face discussions with method statements and drawings or visiting the site. The second 206 
one could be utilizing computer software systems such as DFSP tool (Hadikusumo and 207 
Rowlinson 2004) and ToolSHeD (Cooke et al. 2008) to capture safety information in a database. 208 
 209 
Implementing knowledge management in a construction company faces many barriers. For 210 
example, resources invested in knowledge management of a project do not result in immediate 211 
benefit. Tacit knowledge is difficult to capture because construction projects are dispersed. There 212 
are also other barriers such as limit of time, high turnover rates, early retirement, lack of a 213 
knowledge management budget, low acceptance to new things, poor IT infrastructure, and others 214 
(Hallowell 2012). Construction companies are reluctant to invest in knowledge management and 215 
support initiatives because of lack of standard work processes, low profit margin and 216 
conservative culture (Carrillo and Chinowsky 2006).   217 
 218 
To motivate people to share knowledge, some companies give monetary rewards to those who 219 
are willing to share knowledge. However, it was found that monetary returns may adversely 220 
affect people’s intrinsic motivation to share knowledge. Javernick-Will (2012) revealed the 221 
power of social motivations for people to share knowledge in engineering and construction 222 
organizations. Javernick-Will’s study found that people are willing to share knowledge due to 223 
reciprocity, conformity to corporate culture, mimicking the behavior of leaders, peer recognition, 224 
and honoring knowledge sharing commitments. For reciprocity, people feel obliged to share 225 
knowledge when the others have done so to them. If there is a corporate culture of sharing 226 
knowledge, people working in that organization will also follow the norm to share knowledge. 227 
Leaders are often the role model of fellow team members. If leaders take the lead to share 228 
knowledge, fellow members will follow. People are motivated to share knowledge so as to gain 229 
peer recognition. When people are committed to share knowledge either verbally or in written 230 
form, they are motivated to honor their commitment. Javernick-Will (2012) proposed a number 231 
of management strategies to motivate employees to share knowledge, such as promoting people 232 
who engage in knowledge sharing, promoting norms of knowledge sharing, recognizing the 233 
behavior of sharing knowledge with peer-recognition awards, and encouraging employees to 234 
make commitment to knowledge sharing.   235 
 236 
Research methods 237 
 238 
RMAA contractors were targeted for interviews. Invitations were sent to 17 RMAA contractors 239 
on the approved contractors’ list of a property management company in Hong Kong. Eight 240 
RMAA contracting companies responded favorably to the research interview request. Face-to-241 
face interviews were conducted with senior management representatives of these eight 242 
companies between December 2008 and February 2009. Each interview lasted for approximately 243 
an hour. Each interview was tape-recorded and transcribed for later coding of data.  244 
As shown in Table 1, the interviews A to C, D to F, and G to H represent views of RMAA 245 
contractors undertaking large-, medium-, and small-sized RMAA projects in Hong Kong 246 
respectively. Interviewees were requested to briefly describe safety management practice of their 247 
company and share their experience of managing RMAA projects with outstanding safety 248 
performance. 249 
 250 
Table 1. Background of the interviewees.  251 
No. of Interviews Position of interviewees Companies’ project scale/ nature 
A Director Around USD$ 1.3 million - USD$ 13 
million 
B Project Safety Manager & Project 
Manager 
Around USD$ 1.3 million - USD$ 13 
million 
C Managing Director & Senior Manager More than USD$ 13 million, term contract 
D Executive Director Less than USD$ 2.6 million 
E Managing Director Around USD$ 1.3 million 
F General Manager Around USD$ 1.3 million 
G Senior Project Manager Around USD$ 1,300- USD$ 260,000 
H Director Around USD$ 1, 000 - USD$ 1.3 million 
 252 
 253 
 254 
Qualitative interview data transcribed into narratives were coded by constant comparative 255 
method (Grove 1988; Ryan and Bernard 2000) in NVivo 8, software for qualitative data analysis. 256 
Interview data concerning safety management systems were analyzed in regard to processes of 257 
knowledge management. Data of common themes and similar semantic meanings were initially 258 
coded together as the same category. For example, the concepts of “guidelines” and “practice 259 
notes” that appeared in transcripts were coded in the same category. Each category was then 260 
compared with other categories continuously during the coding process for refinement until each 261 
presented a clear and distinct categorization.  262 
 263 
Results and discussions 264 
 265 
Safety management practices adopted by the interviewees were analyzed from a knowledge 266 
management perspective to see how safety knowledge is acquired, stored and transferred. 267 
Interview findings are summarized in Tables 2 to 4. As shown in Table 2, interviewees identified 268 
10 initiatives to capture safety knowledge in RMAA contracting companies. Safety knowledge is 269 
acquired by most interviewed RMAA contracting companies through legislation and regulation, 270 
management site visit, regular safety meeting at management level, pre-project safety planning, 271 
and risk assessment. Management site visit is adopted by many small-sized RMAA contracting 272 
companies interviewed.  273 
 274 
Legislation and regulation is the main source of acquiring explicit safety knowledge. Guidelines 275 
and practices are available from the Occupational Safety and Health Council and the Labour 276 
Department. RMAA contracting companies/units which are subsidiaries/sections of big 277 
contractors follow the safety practices of their parent companies and thus tend to have a more 278 
formal and established system of safety knowledge acquisition. For example, Interviewee A 279 
stated that: 280 
 281 
 “There is standard safety practice, we follow [parent] company safety plan. We issue practice notes on 282 
working at height because RMAA works involve lots of working at height. Disciplinary actions will be 283 
taken if practice notes are violated, no matter by worker, subcontractor, site agent, foreman, or project 284 
manager. There will be verbal warning; written warning and the heaviest disciplinary action would be 285 
dismissal.” (Interviewee A) 286 
 287 
Company B has a department designated to undertake RMAA works. Similarly, interviewees 288 
representing company B expressed that RMAA works follows the same safety policy as for new 289 
works. Parent company of company F had a safety department consisting of 20 to 30 people. 290 
Two to three of them were assigned to oversee RMAA projects of company F.  291 
 292 
Site visit of management is the major source of capturing tacit safety knowledge. Tacit 293 
knowledge is better captured in RMAA contracting firms which undertake large scale RMAA 294 
projects. For large projects, there is safety walk conducted by project manager (Interviewee F), 295 
safety officers will be stationed on site, and attend regular safety meetings. As for company C, 296 
interviewees stated that a number of initiatives were in place to analyze project information 297 
relating to ensure safety:  298 
 299 
“Project manager and resident safety officer will produce 3-month forecast to identify high hazard activities 300 
in detail. After identifying the activities, they will produce method statement, risk assessment, and then 301 
safety precaution measures and finally pre-work meeting. In the meeting, safety officer, project team and 302 
subcontractors will sit together to make clear how the work should be done. During implementation, there 303 
is monitoring; if deviated from the plan, they will fine tune the process.” (Company C)     304 
 305 
Safety practices for SMEs are very limited. Safety management of SMEs largely depends on the 306 
attitude of managerial staff. Safety is better managed if managerial staff visits the site frequently 307 
and uphold safety standards seriously. Interviewee E mentioned that “there is safety meeting, site 308 
safety plan and site risk assessment for individual project but their implementation depends very 309 
much on the site agent”. For small RMAA contracting companies, safety depends on supervisors 310 
and the workers themselves. As revealed by interviewee H, “For large projects, supervisors will 311 
be placed on site to ensure safety. For very small project, workers largely depend on their self-312 
regulation because safety supervisor only visits the site occasionally”.  313 
 314 
Regular safety meeting, pre-project safety planning and risk assessment can both capture explicit 315 
and tacit safety knowledge. These tactics help the project team to analyze the construction 316 
methods of RMAA works to be undertaken, identify potential safety hazards and plan 317 
coordination works. Coordination work is particularly important in RMAA works because 318 
RMAA works often affect the public and the neighborhood.      319 
 320 
Table 2. Knowledge acquisition 321 
Knowledge acquisition A B C D E F G H Total 
Legislation and regulation X X X X X X X X 8 
Company safety plan/ practice notes X     X   2 
Regular safety meeting at management level   X X  X   3 
Accident analysis   X      1 
Pre-project safety planning  X X  X    3 
Risk assessment   X X  X    3 
In-house case sharing X        1 
Safety workshop/meeting at site level X    X    2 
Management site visit    X  X X X 4 
Good practices from new works    X     1 
 322 
 323 
Referring to Table 3, safety knowledge storage initiatives are very limited and traditional. Safety 324 
plan and project safety plan are the two most common ways of keeping safety information. This 325 
indicates that safety knowledge has not been properly stored and managed. Only one interviewee 326 
can indicate other methods of keeping safety knowledge, such as near miss report, accident 327 
report and quarterly hazard forecast. RMAA projects of SMEs are so small in scale that 328 
interviewees did not mention any application of software systems to store safety knowledge.  329 
 330 
Table 3. Knowledge storage 331 
Knowledge storage A B C D E F G H Total 
Company safety plan X X X X X X X X 8 
Project safety plan X X X X X X X X 8 
Near miss report  X       1 
Accident report    X      1 
Quarterly hazard forecast   X      1 
 332 
 333 
Regarding knowledge transfer (Table 4), eight initiatives were identified by the interviewees. 334 
Developing partnership with subcontractors, pre-work safety briefing with workers and safety 335 
department of parent company are the most common ways of transferring safety knowledge. 336 
Other ways include toolbox talk, safety training, newsletter/bulletin, safety notices and employ 337 
direct labour with good safety performance as gangers.  338 
 339 
Knowledge can be transferred to the next project by having partnership with subcontractors. For 340 
example, Company G provides half-day safety training to subcontractors’ workers to renew their 341 
green cards every three years free of charge. This can guarantee the quality of safety training. 342 
Valuable lessons learned from a project can be carried forward to the next by having a stable 343 
project team. Site supervision of subcontractors in RMAA projects is limited due to scattered 344 
location of RMAA projects and limited safety resources for small-sized projects. Hence, 345 
selection of subcontractors with good safety performance is important. Developing long-term 346 
working relationships with subcontractors with good safety performance is one of the 347 
recommended strategies to improve safety performance of RMAA works (Hon et al., 2011) 348 
According to interviewee C, subcontractors will be allowed to adjust their tender prices after the 349 
tender interview if they consider the safety standard is more stringent than what they have priced 350 
in their tender submissions. If accident happens, there will be a panel enquiry. The panel will 351 
urge the subcontractor to submit improvement plan to rectify unsafe conditions and practices.  352 
 353 
Table 4. Knowledge transfer 354 
Knowledge transfer A B C D E F G H Total 
Safety department of parent company X   X  X   3 
Toolbox talk   X      1 
Safety training  X     X  2 
Newsletter/bulletin   X      1 
Safety notices       X  1 
Pre-work safety briefing with workers X X   X    3 
Direct labour as gangers   X       1 
Partnership with subcontractor  X X X     X 4 
 355 
 356 
Although safety knowledge management is rather inadequate in most interviewed RMAA 357 
contracting companies, most interviewees agreed that learning and innovation is important to 358 
achieve good safety performance. As reflected by Interviewee A, learning and innovation is 359 
crucial for a RMAA company to have outstanding safety performance. Interviewee A quoted an 360 
example that in a project with outstanding safety performance, contractor based on its own 361 
expertise and experience proposed an alternative method of construction which is much safer but 362 
still achieving the same purpose of alternation and addition work. Interview C quoted an 363 
example of innovation. Having analyzed previous injury record, the site staff thought of buying 364 
small trucks to prevent injuries of workers when moving materials from one place to another. 365 
These are good examples of safety knowledge transfer from project to project.  366 
 367 
In line with the findings of Kamara et al. (2002), most of the RMAA contracting companies do 368 
not have formal knowledge management strategies to reuse safety knowledge captured in 369 
different projects. Rather, they rely on the same organizational strategies to manipulate safety 370 
knowledge in the industry. This study also echoes with Hallowell (2012) that companies 371 
successfully turning tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge for utilization of the company tend 372 
to have better safety performance. In general, RMAA contracting companies undertaking large 373 
scale RMAA projects have more initiatives to improve safety.  374 
 375 
Legislation and regulations are basic explicit safety knowledge acquired by RMAA contracting 376 
companies. However, it is the responsibility of RMAA contracting companies to design their 377 
own safety management systems and company safety plans. Although RMAA works share some 378 
similarities with new works, RMAA works have their uniqueness such as multi-tasking, 379 
dispersed in location etc. Some of the existing safety legislation and regulations do not fit well 380 
with RMAA works. For example, only projects over 100 workers are legally required to employ 381 
a safety officer on site; however, a RMAA project seldom reaches this scale and is therefore not 382 
bounded by this legal requirement. Safety officers are often not employed in RMAA projects, 383 
instead safety supervisors are employed. Safety officers, who are fully designated to safety, have 384 
more knowledge and greater authority in upholding safety than safety supervisors who are 385 
usually site foremen or project engineers playing the dual role to run the project and uphold 386 
safety concurrently (Hon et al. 2010). Another example is that projects with contract sum less 387 
than HK$ 1,000,000 (US$ 128,000; at a rate US$1 = HK$7.8) are not required by law for the 388 
contractor to inform the Labour Department of Hong Kong. Thus, many small-scaled RMAA 389 
projects are exempted from this regulation, resulting in less surveillance of the government 390 
regulatory body to the RMAA works than to the new works (Hon et al. 2010)   391 
 392 
Lessons learned and best practices of safety are carried forward to the next project if site 393 
supervisor proactively share the knowledge know-how. An experienced site supervisor/engineer 394 
has the ability to identify potential safety hazards that will occur in the projects. Nevertheless, 395 
there are no formal strategies to capture the tacit knowledge possessed by site supervisors. This 396 
is especially the case for RMAA works. Site supervisors are not fully designated to take care of 397 
safety. They have to consider other aspects of the project. Due to tight project schedule, they 398 
simply cannot spend time and effort in sharing the tacit knowledge they have in mind. However, 399 
they are the people who possess abundant project safety knowledge to share.  400 
 401 
Construction processes of new works are relatively well-planned; however, that of RMAA works 402 
are rather unforeseeable and ad hoc. Thus, tacit knowledge is extremely important in RMAA 403 
works. Undocumented building changes could be found in RMAA project sites, making the 404 
originally planned RMAA work dangerous to execute. For example, interviewee A recalled that 405 
site project staff of an alteration and addition project suggested a design change because 406 
construction method of the original design was unsafe. The project was an alteration and addition 407 
work in a shopping arcade to have a leveled slab for retailing. Interviewee A proposed a design 408 
change because the original plan was too dangerous. The first level of the shopping arcade was a 409 
cinema and the ground floor level was a market. The original plan was to take away the slab and 410 
lower the floor level. From the as-built drawings, there were double slabs but they did not exist 411 
in reality for some unknown reasons. That being the case, it would be very dangerous to execute 412 
the planned alteration and addition work and it would also affect the business of shops on the 413 
ground level. Proposals were finally made to raise the floor and use up the excessive headroom. 414 
The proposed design change not only resulted in ad hoc savings but also maintained safety of the 415 
end-users (shops and customers in the market) throughout the project.  416 
 417 
RMAA contracting companies face severe competition. In order to survive, they need to develop 418 
into a learning organization which keeps on sharpening their competitive edge (Chinowsky and 419 
Carrillo, 2007). Safety is one such priority areas that cannot be neglected. It is recommended that 420 
RMAA contracting companies should encourage project managers/site supervisors to carry out 421 
pre-project safety meeting and post-project review. Their experiences are valuable in identifying 422 
potential safety hazards and preventing injuries. However, according to the interviewees there 423 
are barriers of implementing safety practices such as frequent turnover of site staff and limited 424 
resources for safety. Safety knowledge is not captured because there is little time and resources 425 
for safety. Resources for safety often depend on the project size. Many RMAA works are small 426 
in scale and short in duration. Many companies hold the view that it is not realistic to invest in 427 
safety for such minute projects (Hon et al. 2012). Thus, safety management of RMAA projects is 428 
often inadequate. It is recommended that the government should provide assistance to RMAA 429 
contracting companies to implement proper safety management practices in small scale projects. 430 
Computer software technology has been used in new construction projects (Hadikusumo and 431 
Rowlinson, 2004) but it is seldom used in RMAA projects. It is recommended that user-friendly 432 
software/ databases should be introduced to RMAA works to store and maintain safety 433 
knowledge. As advocated by Javernick-Will (2012), management strategies should be designed 434 
to promote social motivation to share knowledge. As for RMAA companies, they should 435 
cultivate the safety knowledge sharing culture within and across project teams, recognize/award 436 
the employees who are willing to share their knowledge to deliver the project safely, identify 437 
potential safety hazards, and set up a mentorship system which assigns experienced workers as 438 
mentors to teach newcomers. These strategies may help people interact and enhance knowledge 439 
sharing.  440 
 441 
Conclusions and recommendations  442 
 443 
To conclude, this study has analyzed safety management practices of RMAA contracting 444 
companies in Hong Kong from a knowledge management perspective. Many RMAA contracting 445 
companies are SMEs and they do not have formal knowledge management system; however, 446 
there are initiatives in the safety management system to capture tacit knowledge and best 447 
practices. Safety knowledge management has the potential to enhance safety capability of 448 
construction companies. Since RMAA works rely more on people and workmanship than new 449 
construction works, RMAA works need to make use of tacit knowledge to better manage safety. 450 
From the findings of the structured interviews, safety knowledge of RMAA contracting 451 
companies not having been captured effectively will be lost when project finishes. As revealed 452 
by interviewees A to C, RMAA companies with a proper system to capture knowledge generated 453 
from previous projects and transfer to future projects tend to have better safety performance. 454 
Currently, most RMAA contracting companies do not have a formal mechanism to turn tacit 455 
knowledge into explicit knowledge. Thus, attitude of managerial staff and site supervisor play a 456 
crucial role in safety knowledge management. Although this study was conducted in Hong Kong, 457 
it is expected that findings of this study are applicable to other geographical locations with 458 
expanding RMAA sectors and provide insights to industry practitioners and researchers 459 
concerning about construction safety. Data collection of this study is limited by only eight 460 
interviews. For further research, investigations could be extended to a larger number of RMAA 461 
contractors and compare safety management practices with contractors undertaking new 462 
construction projects. Safety knowledge management has the potential of improving safety 463 
performance of RMAA contracting companies. Strategies should be formulated to motivate 464 
employees to share safety knowledge. Proper recognition should be given to those who are 465 
willing to share knowledge, from managers, supervisors to workers. In the long run, RMAA 466 
contracting companies should target to develop into a learning organization which builds on 467 
learning and innovative culture.   468 
 469 
Appendix.  List of Abbreviations 470 
RMAA Repair, maintenance, minor alteration and addition 
MBIS Mandatory Building Inspection Scheme 
MWIS Mandatory Window Inspection Scheme 
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises  
 471 
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